Fighting the Enemies of God: the Rise of and the Response to Violent Extremism in Sudan by Abdalla, Salma Mohamed Abdalmunim
  
 
 
 
 
Salma Mohamed Abdalmunim Abdalla: Fighting the Enemies of God 
 
 
 
 
75 
Fighting the Enemies of God: the Rise of and the Response to 
Violent Extremism in Sudan 
 
Salma Mohamed Abdalmunim Abdallaa1 
aPostdoctoral Fellow, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU) 
 
Article History 
Received May 24, 2019 
Accepted Jul 29, 2019 
Published Sept 27, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Keywords: Violent extremism, deradicalization, Pan-Islamism, Salafi-jihadism, Sudan 
 
Introduction  
 
Sudan had never before experienced violent extremism as seriously as in recent years. The 
emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attracted both global and domestic 
attention in the summer of 2014 (Al-Shaikh, 2014; Westphal, 2018). Subsequently, alarming 
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Abstract 
This article explores the rise of and the response to violent extremism, as well as 
the state of affairs regarding deradicalization programs in Sudan. Based on 18 
interviews with policy makers, deradicalization program staff and relatives of ISIS 
members, it argues that the growth of violent extremism in Sudan is far from 
being solely an extension of the global jihad movements; rather, it is a 
manifestation of domestic political and historical dynamics. This article 
demonstrates that violent extremism is embedded in the Islamization project that 
was launched by the Inqāz regime—a radical, military Islamist government that 
seized power in 1989—and a political ideology that created the conditions for 
violent extremism to thrive. Furthermore, the article illustrates two Salafi-jihadist 
domestic groups that are committed to establishing a global Islamic state and 
legitimate the use of violence to achieve their political and religious goals. This 
article analyzes the various narratives employed by the regime to dissociate the 
country from violent extremism and to portray it as a recent and foreign 
phenomenon. One key finding of this paper is that deradicalization in Sudan is 
practiced in the context where the regime attempts to balance between two 
contradicting interests: it tries to remove Sudan from the US government list of 
state sponsors of terrorism, on one hand, and to maintain the regime’s questioned 
local Islamic legitimacy, on the other hand. 
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news was broadcasted about the Sudanese individuals and groups that joined ISIS between 
March and June 2015 ("A Group of University Students Heads to ISIS," 2015; Yaqoub, 
2015). For instance, ISIS recruited a group of students of British-Sudanese origin from the 
private University of Medical Science and Technology (UMST), who had been enrolled to 
become doctors, dentists, and pharmacists (Daftari, 2017). The group that held foreign 
passports and included women and children set off for Syria from Khartoum via Turkey 
(Yaqoub, 2015). The recruits came from diverse backgrounds, such as middle-class and elite 
families (Awad, 2015). Interestingly, the Turkish authorities managed to intercept a few of the 
student recruits on their way to the Syrian border, following intensive communication with 
their parents and the Sudanese authorities ("Turkey Intercepted Sudanese Students," 2015). A 
Palestinian-British UMST student was accused of recruiting the students to join ISIS after 
indoctrinating them through a Salafi-jihadist2 student association called JamꜤiyat al-Ḥaḍāra 
al-ᵓIslāmiya (JHI, Islamic Civilization Society) (2015). JHI not only targeted the students with 
foreign passports but also offered them religious lessons in English—an easily accessible 
language to the Sudanese youths who had returned to Sudan from abroad. The UMST 
abolished political activities but allowed Salafi-jihadist activities on campus, such as inviting 
radical preachers to deliver speeches in which they openly supported ISIS’s cause ("Islamic 
Civilization Association," 2015).  
There is no reliable data about the number of the Sudanese youths who have joined the 
violent extremist groups, but the United Nation Development Program estimates that more 
than 3,000 people have joined ISIS and Boko Haram3 since 2016 (Salim & Ibrahim, 2018). 
Experts believe that the disclosed figure represents only the tip of the iceberg, and the 
Sudanese government downplays the role of its citizens who have joined ISIS (Al-Hidaibi, 
2016; Elnour, 2017; "Jihadist Groups Expert," 2015; "Participation of 260 Sudanese in ISIS," 
2017). Despite the relatively small number of Sudanese joining ISIS, the attention drawn by 
 
2 Salafi is a group within Sunni Islamism that emphasizes the importance of returning to a “pure” Islam, that of 
the Salaf, the pious ancestors. Salafi-jihadist groups believe that violent jihad is a personal religious duty (Jones, 
2014). 
3 Boko Haram is an extremist movement operating primarily in Nigeria’s northeast region extending into the 
border areas of the neighboring West African states of Chad, Cameroon, and Niger (Pieri & Zenn, 2016). 
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the path taken by these students signals the growing concern among the Sudanese public 
(Noah, 2016). Given this context, this paper intends to provide an understanding of the rise of 
violent extremism in Sudan and the country’s response to it since 2014. 
This paper presents two central arguments. First, the growth of violent extremism in 
Sudan since 2014 has been far from being solely an extension of the global jihad movements; 
rather, it is a manifestation of domestic political and historical dynamics. In contrast to the 
official narrative that portrays violent extremism as a recent and foreign phenomenon in 
Sudan, this paper argues that violent extremism evolved and was maintained by the Inqāz 
regime—a radical, military Islamist government that seized power in 1989, governing through 
the National Islamic Front (NIF), which was subsequently renamed the National Congress 
Party (NCP) (El-Battahani, 2016). Second, the Sudanese government’s response and approach 
to combating violent extremism in the country has been merely a tactic aimed at bringing the 
regime both political and economic gains.  
When analyzing the deradicalization program in any given context, it is crucial to take 
into account the political, social, and relational setting that gives rise to violent extremism 
(Marsden, 2017, p. 3). Studying the political conditions that gave rise to violent extremism 
and shape the deradicalization practices are key to countering and preventing it. Given the 
growing number of Sudanese recruited to engage in violent extremism, this paper provides 
insights into the current deradicalization landscape in Sudan. Advancing the understanding of 
the rise of and the response to violent extremism in such a context is crucial and even doubly 
important when knowing that the jihad ideology remains alive and recruitment rates are 
increasing, despite ISIS’s military defeats in Syria and Iraq (Nasira, 2008). Thus, the ideology 
of founding an Islamic caliphate on the basis of violent means has exhibited resilience and 
adaptability to changing circumstances and is likely to inspire new jihadists in different forms 
and settings.  
This paper is an outcome of the qualitative field research undertaken in Khartoum, 
Sudan between July and August 2018. The author interviewed 18 informants active in 
fighting violent extremism in Sudan: three staff members from the governmental 
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deradicalization center, two from the National Commission for Counter Terrorism, three 
religious scholars involved in religious dialogue with extremists, five relatives of ISIS 
members, as well as five members of civil society organizations involved in preventing 
violent extremism in Sudan. In-depth and semi-structured interviews with informants 
provided insights into the rise of and response to violent extremism in Sudan. Before the 
interviews commenced, the researcher prepared an interview guide and adapted the question 
order according to each interviewee. Whenever needed, follow-up interviews were conducted 
to clarify or complete missing information. The author conducted the interviews in Arabic, 
and the participants chose a time and location that suited them. Before and throughout the 
study, the researcher provided participants with information about the purpose of the study to 
allow them to make an informed decision about their participation in the study. Each 
participant gave verbal or written consent to participate in the study. Due to the sensitivity of 
the topic, the identities of some interviewees were anonymized. The identities of public 
figures and state officials that make public statements to the press about their role in the 
deradicalization process are not anonymized. Using the thematic content analysis approach, 
the author manually analyzed interviews and identified themes and patterns important to the 
description of the trajectories of the rise of violent extremism in Sudan and the 
deradicalization practices in the country. 
Newspaper articles have been valuable primary sources of information for this paper. 
The author collected relevant printed and online newspaper articles, both local and 
international and in Arabic and English, that were published from 2014 to 2018. Grey 
literature was very useful, too; the author collected relevant materials, such as laws, reports, 
policy papers, and government documents, produced by government agencies, academic 
centers, and consultants. This study’s limitations include the unavailability of reliable figures 
about violent extremism, the secret nature of and fragmentations within radical groups, many 
of which chose to detach themselves from society. Given the topic’s sensitivity, the relatives 
of the individuals who joined or returned from ISIS were reluctant to provide information 
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about the journey that led their sons to ISIS, for fear of backlash by the Sudanese security 
forces.    
As a conduit between actors and policymakers, this paper analyzes the rise of violent 
extremism in Sudan and describes deradicalization programs in Sudan. The first section of the 
paper gives an overview of what is already known in the literature about deradicalization 
interventions, particularly the religious rehabilitation programs. The second section analyzes 
the trajectories of the rise of violent extremism in Sudan. The third section presents the 
response to the rise of violent extremism in Sudan and describes the deradicalization practices 
in the country. The final section discusses this study’s results. 
 
Deradicalizing jihadists through religious rehabilitation 
 
To many scholars, the role of the jihadi ideology is less important in the deradicalization 
process. It is often overlooked and may be deemed secondary. However, this aspect of 
deradicalization is key to a successful deradicalization of jihadists, particularly in the context 
where the religious factor has proven to be the main driver for radicalization. According to El-
Said (2015), deradicalization “refers to a package of policies and measures designed and 
implemented by authorities in order to normalize and convince groups and individuals who 
have already become radicalized or violent extremists to repent and disengage from violence” 
(p. 10). This definition emphasizes the state’s role in the deradicalization process and 
expresses optimism about the authorities’ capacity to disengage violent extremists. In 
contrast, Horgan (2009) identifies deradicalization as “the social and psychological process 
whereby an individual’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced 
to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity” 
(p. 153).  
Barrelle (2015) investigated the phenomenon of individual voluntary disengagement 
from violent extremism in a Western context. The study ascertained that disengagement is an 
identity transition and that sustained disengagement is actually about the proactive, holistic 
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and harmonious engagement the person has with wider society afterward. Similarly to this, 
Dalgaard-Nielsen’s (2013) study on promoting exit from violent extremism argued that an 
external intervention should utilize internal contradictions, dilemma, and tensions within the 
extremist group, as well as narratives to promote attitudinal change via behavioral change as 
an alternative to seek to influence beliefs directly. Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek’s 
(2010) study showed that for deradicalization programs to succeed, there must be extensive 
efforts that include affective, pragmatic, and ideological components and considerable 
aftercare. Prison-based deradicalization programs, in particular, need to exercise caution, 
carefully evaluating each individual before release and implementing safeguards, such as 
monitoring, to protect against the eventuality that former militants could once again take up 
arms (Rabasa et al., 2010).      
El-Said (2015) investigates the “soft” approaches to countering violent extremists and 
finds that religious rehabilitation is one of various measures in deradicalization programs that 
can be either collective (occurring among entire groups or organizations) or individual 
(aiming at deradicalizing individuals). The government can initiate these programs, or the 
jihadists themselves can initiate the deradicalization process, either inside or outside prisons. 
However, while many jihadists with radical ideas may participate in religious rehabilitation, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, this may not necessarily mean their repentance and 
disengagement from violence. Notably, El-Said (2015) identifies the conditions conducive to 
deradicalization, including macro-national factors and micro components of successful 
programs. He finds that strong states with a development capacity and trusted civil society are 
among the macro-national factors favorable to fruitful deradicalization. As one of the 
components of successful programs, religious rehabilitation may delegitimize the actions of 
terrorists and refute their theoretical and ideological justifications through religious debates 
between scholars and jihadists. For Marsden (2017, p. 14), religious rehabilitation can also 
take the form of religious instruction, specifically one-on-one dialogues with scholars or ex-
militants, organized classes, and group work. El-Said (2015) adds to this view by stating that 
the religious debate approach is rooted in Muslim culture and history, where scholars and 
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detainees discuss the issues that justify violence, such as jihad, the relationship with the West, 
and international treaties. In this process, scholars promote a version of Islam that protects life 
and resolves conflict. Therefore, it is suggested that religious rehabilitation requires a 
sufficient number of competent, knowledgeable, moderate, and highly respected scholars.  
Theological counseling is used in the Sudanese deradicalization program but it has 
been criticized by scholars and in other programs. In his analysis of practical and theoretical 
aspects of deradicalization programs, Koehler (2017) emphasizes the scholars’ crucial role in 
religious rehabilitation programs. He suggests that respected scholars and authorities could 
hold theological and ideological debates with jihadists, aimed to deglamorize and de-idealize 
the use of violence. Theological counseling, which is largely used in the Middle East and 
South Asia, is based on the premise that Islamist extremists have been misguided and 
indoctrinated with a perverted understanding of Islam and aims to teach participants its 
correct tenets (Koehler, 2017). Furthermore, according to Marsden, the deradicalization 
intervention that addresses ideological issues assumes that “prisoners had been misled and 
need help to return to the correct path” (2017, p. 14). By challenging the leading extremist 
detainees, this tool aims to remove the aspect of religious legitimization of violence as the 
condition for jihad. However, it was argued that direct ideological confrontation might lead to 
reactance and even deepen the radicalization (Braddock, 2014; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). In 
Al-Hadlaq’s account of the Saudi-Arabian deradicalization program, even highest ranking 
religious scholars were seen largely as ineffective in using theological confrontation to 
deradicalize terrorist inmates (2015). 
Besides the top-down approach, the radical group itself can initiate the 
deradicalization process. Ashour (2009) suggests that the radical group may undergo the 
process of change, reverse its ideology, and delegitimize the use of violent methods to achieve 
its political goals. Both Ashour (2009) and El-Said (2015) agree that the deradicalization 
process among radical groups may include a behavioral change by abandoning the use of 
violence, with or without a cognitive change in ideological delegitimization. However, 
Marsden (2017) challenges the assumption that changing someone’s commitment to violent 
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extremism will lead to a change in behavior. For Marsden, the theory that ideas and beliefs 
inform behavior has no solid basis because sometimes, the ideological commitment develops 
after engaging in a radical setting (p. 14).  
Several typologies of deradicalization approaches and programs have been developed. 
For instance, Koehler’s (2017) typology classifies and compares various deradicalization and 
disengagement programs worldwide. In Koehler’s typology, Type D is a government-run 
program that relies on theological and ideological debates utilizing the state-sanctioned 
version of Islam in an attempt to create a cognitive opening or induce individual 
deradicalization (2017, p. 125). He suggests that this type of deradicalization faces resistance 
from committed extremists because for them, the government is part of the enemy. Ashour 
(2009) classifies deradicalization into comprehensive, substantial, and pragmatic approaches. 
According to this classification, the comprehensive deradicalization has three levels: 
behavioral, organizational, and ideological. Barrett and Bokhari (2009, pp. 175-176) list four 
types of deradicalization and rehabilitation programs targeting religious terrorists and 
extremists in the Muslim world: 1) re-education and rehabilitation based on providing a 
different truth, 2) the creation of a space and an opportunity to vent frustration, 3) programs 
that provide an alternative lifestyle, and 4) amnesty programs.  
It is important to consider the context when reflecting on the practices of 
deradicalization programs. For instance, El-Said and Harrigan’s (2013) empirical analysis of 
Yemen’s process of religious dialogue inside prisons shows the role of internal and 
international contexts in the process. Their study finds that the Committee of Dialogue, 
established in 2002 to convince jihadist detainees to repent and abandon violence, has been a 
balancing act between the need to appear as a reliable partner in the “war on terror” and the 
need to accommodate the wishes of the tribal population with some Islamist sympathies. 
Barrett and Bokhari’s (2009) case study of the Committee of Dialogue in Yemen outlines the 
issues discussed between the scholars and the detainees. For instance, the detainees expressed 
their frustration that Yemen was not an Islamic state, whereas the scholars tried to prove the 
Islamic nature of the state and showed their preparedness to amend the laws to be SharīꜤa 
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(Islamic law) compliant. They also debated whether it would be Islamic to attack non-
Muslims. The Yemeni government mentioned that the program participants were born outside 
Yemen to Yemeni parents and radicalized abroad. At the end of the program, the detainees 
would be required to sign a document renouncing violence. According to Barrett and Bokhari 
(2009), the dialogue achieved the recognition of the legitimacy of the Yemeni government 
and stopped targeting Westerners. The regime was less interested in actual ideological 
engagement and more concerned about political expediency because of the US pressure on 
Yemen. The absence of an independent mechanism to oversee the program exposed the 
program as leading to grievances and victimization of the detainees.  
The ideological approach to deradicalization has its skeptics. Marsden’s (2017) study 
on reintegration of extremists, deradicalization, and desistance is critical of the focus on 
debating about the ideology of the detainees without taking into account the political, social, 
and relational setting that informs their experience in the community. She stresses that 
considering this context gives space for a holistic approach that allows focusing on the 
individuals’ opportunity for reintegration. As part of the deradicalization process, the 
ideological approach is challenged by Marsden (2017) for overlooking an individual’s 
relational context, neglecting an individual’s agency, and disregarding society’s role in 
radicalization and reintegration processes. The work of Bjørgo and Horgan’s (2009) on the 
processes by which individuals and groups disengage from terrorism shows that intellectual 
debate as a tool for disengagement from religious movements is criticized for being coercive. 
The deprogramming is used to pull out young people from the new religious movements and 
is more akin to a kind of brainwashing other than that employed in the recruitment and the 
resocialization techniques used by these new religious movements.  
The question of how individuals and groups in Sudan have been radicalized lies at the 
forefront. What historical context has led to the rise of violent extremism in Sudan? 
Understanding the political conditions during the rise of violent extremism is essential to 
further the conversation that scholars are creating to grasp the practices of deradicalization 
programs. 
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Context of violent extremism in Sudan 
 
Violent extremism is not a new phenomenon in Sudan. In the 1970s, the country witnessed 
terrorism events, such as the assassination of the US ambassador and his deputy in the 1973 
attack by the Black September terrorist organization in Khartoum ("Association for 
Diplomatic Studies and Training, 1998). In 1988, members of the Iraqi Arab Socialist Ba’ath 
Party assassinated the Iraqi Shi’ite leader Mahdi al-Hakim while he was attending the NIF 
conference in Khartoum (Al-Awad, 2016). These two terrorist events occurred on Sudanese 
soil but targeted foreigners and were committed by foreigners. However, a new level of 
violent extremism has emerged during the Islamists’ era in Sudan (1989–2019). Table 1 
presents an overview of the series of violent extremism events in Sudan since the 1990s. It 
shows that religious ideology has motivated these events, and/or the local political conditions 
have been conducive for their occurrence.        
 
Table 1. Overview of events linked to terrorism in Sudan  
 Year Event Place Executed by  
1 1991–
1996 
Al Qaeda members and Osama bin Laden 
lived in Sudan. 
Sudan Al Qaeda 
2 1994 Sudanese authorities arrested the most 
wanted terrorist Carlos the Jackal4 and 
handed him over to French authorities. 
Khartoum Sudan’s National 
Intelligence and 
Security Service  
3 1994 The attack on worshipers in al-Thawra 
mosque killed 28 and injured 35 people. 
Omdurman Abdalrahman Al-
Khulaify5 
4 1996 Authorities captured the Takfiri Group Omdurman Abu Ayob Al-Barqawi 
 
4 Carlos the Jackal entered Sudan in 1991, carrying a passport with the name Ali Barakat, issued by an Arab 
country. The regime’s policy that required no entry visa from Arab visitors smoothed his entrance without 
discovering his real identity (Kafil, 2017).  
5 Al-Khulaify, a Libyan leader of the Takfir wal-Hijra cell, came from Afghanistan when Sudan opened its doors 
to Arabs without an entry visa.   
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for possession of weapons intended for 
carrying out attacks.  
Takfiri Group6 
5 1996 Jihadists attacked the Kambo ʾashara 
area and killed eight persons. 
Wad 
Madani 
Nineteen individuals 
from the Takfir wal-
Hijra Group7 
6 1998 The US government launched an attack 
on the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory 
for allegedly manufacturing chemical 
weapons and being accused of ties to Al 
Qaeda.8   
Khartoum the USA 
7 2000 An attack on worshipers in al-Jarafa 
mosque killed 24 and injured 40 people. 
Omdurman Abbas Al-Baghir9 
from Takfir wal-Hijra 
Group 
8 2003 A terrorist cell composed of 18 
individuals established a military training 
camp and was arrested by Sudanese 
authorities. 
Laqawa, 
Western 
Kordufan 
Summaya Al-Zarqa 
Group (Al Qaeda) 
9 2007 A jihadist group of 40 individuals was 
arrested for possession of explosions and 
Khartoum Alsalama cell10 
 
6 The emir of the group was active in the Afghan jihad. He held a Sudanese citizenship, was born in Kuwait from 
a Palestinian mother and he has Libyan connection. The group had been active in the city of Omdurman, and 
most of its members subsequently migrated to Somalia (Kabashi, 2013).   
7 This group defected from Salafi Ansar al-Sunna, came to the village on foot, and started preaching Takfiri 
ideology. When the villagers rejected their ideas, they attacked the villagers using cold weapons. The police 
intervened and killed eight members, and nine were injured. This group considered daily practices, such as cash 
transactions, the use of modern transportation, and possession of firearms, forbidden (Kabashi, 2013).         
8 Because of its alleged connection to Al Qaeda, the Al-Shifa factory was attacked by the USA as part of the 
“war on terror” and in retaliation to Al Qaeda’s attack on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Alsalam two 
months earlier on August 20, 1998 (K. A. Mohamed, 2015).  
9 Abbas Al-Baghir was from the Takfir wal-Hijra group and had been a member of the Islamist paramilitary 
Popular Defense Forces that fought in South Sudan in the 1990s.  
10 The authorities found other weapon hideouts in Suba and in al-Hatana areas and arrested 63 other individuals 
involved with this group (Kabashi, 2013).   
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weapons in preparation for their planned 
attacks on state institutions and 
foreigners. 
10 2008 The American diplomat John Granville 
and his driver Abdelrahman Abbas were 
assassinated. 
Khartoum Ansar al-Tawhid 
Salafi-jihadist 
Group 
11 2010 A jihadist group targeted foreigners and 
the general elections. 
Sudan Wadi Hor Group 
12 2012 A jihadist group of 30 individuals was 
captured after establishing a training 
camp equipped with explosions and 
weapons, targeting state institutions and 
foreigners. 
Dinder 
National 
Park 
Du’at al-Sharia 
Group11 
Sources: Updated and adapted (Al-Awad, 2016; Kabashi, 2013; Kafil, 2017)  
Salafi-jihadist groups and Takfiri movements that accuse other Muslims as unbelievers 
and legitimate the use of violence for achieving their goals have played a significant role in 
the execution of mosque attacks and other violent acts in different parts of Sudan. However, 
the pertinent questions are how Salafi-jihadist and Takfiri ideas have spread in Sudan, and 
what conditions have given rise to these groups.  
To understand the rise of violent extremism, it is useful to revisit the last years of 
former President Numeri’s regime (1971–1985) that witnessed a dramatic shift toward the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) political ideology. The regime reconciled with the NIF, and 
religious manifestations surfaced, which soon culminated in the imposition of Islamic laws in 
September 1983. When Islamists seized power in 1989 through a military coup, they 
systematically weakened and displaced secular political parties and liberal movements 
through arbitrary crackdowns and continuous harassments. Religious forces then expanded 
 
11 In this operation, the authorities confiscated weapons and arrested 25 members of the group. The group’s 
leader was a university professor who held a PhD degree in chemistry (Kabashi, 2013).  
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into the spaces that had been long occupied by secular forces, such as civil society, women, 
and youth movements. The regime embarked on Islamization policies that included the 
expansion of religious education, the establishment of Islamic higher educational institutions, 
and Islamic banking. The regime pushed Islam to the public sphere in an unprecedented 
manner by building mosques in all public institutions, increasing the amount of religious 
programs in the media, and glorifying religious occasions (Kabashi, 2013).  
Takfiri ideas came to Sudan after they developed in Egypt’s prisons during the period 
when the state crushed the MB. Some members of the MB believed that no Muslim ruler 
could possibly torture a fellow Muslim in the way that the Egyptian state did to the MB. Thus, 
they declared the Egyptian state and all its supporters as unbelievers (Ashour, 2009). Similar 
to the MB ideology, Takfiri ideas found their way from Egypt to Sudan, and many groups 
adopted the excommunication of the Sudanese ruler and society. Since the 1970s, Salafi-
jihadist ideas have also found their way to Sudan through Sudanese expatriates who have 
migrated to the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, in search of economic opportunities. 
There is strong evidence that when those expatriates return home, either for short or long 
periods, they bring the Salafi views with them, together with their economic fortunes. In the 
Sudanese context, Takfiri ideas emerged during the ideological tensions within the Salafi 
movements, such as Ansar al-Sunna. Ideological differences in the interpretation of certain 
issues did not only lead to defection from an individual’s movement but reached the level of 
violent extremism and attacks on mosques and worshipers, as shown in Table 1 (Kabashi, 
2013).   
 The Inqāz regime policies paved the way for global jihad movements to find a home in 
Sudan and created an environment for the germination of violent extremism. Hassan al-
Turabi, the Islamist regime ideologue, created the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress to unify 
Mujahideen and hardline Islamic militants in Khartoum in 1991. The regime opened the door 
for the Arab “brothers” without an entry visa, and Sudan quickly became a refuge for 
Islamists and global jihadi organizations, such as Al Qaeda. After the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the end of Afghan jihad, Arab Afghans came to Sudan, including Osama bin Laden. The 
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state tolerance toward the Islamists made Sudan a perfect place for the well-funded terrorist 
organizations to settle. According to Hansen (2019), Osama bin Laden’s stay in Sudan 
between 1991 and 1996 strengthened the Al Qaeda organization ideologically and expanded 
its strategic regional network. Besides the economic investments, Al Qaeda’s military 
activities in Sudan supported the Sudanese government in the civil war in South Sudan 
(Hansen, 2019).  
Sudan became an important stopover in the career paths of global jihadi leaders. In 
1992, Osama bin Laden followed by Ayman al-Zawahiry relocated to Khartoum where they 
felt protected, invested and reorganize Islamic Jihad (Wright, 2002). The arrival of the global 
jihad movement was a boost for the Sudanese extremists to spread their Takfiri ideas. The 
Salafi-jihadist movement’s activities flourished in society; it recruited a large number of 
university students and developed a significant presence in the media. The Salafi-jihadist 
groups established training camps for internal terrorist activities and exported activities 
outside Sudan (Kabashi, 2013; K. A. Mohamed, 2015). The regime’s facilitation of the 
establishment of international terrorist organizations that take refuge in Sudan raised Western 
critique and provoked diplomatic pressure on the country (K. A. Mohamed, 2015). For its 
support of international terrorist groups, Sudan was designated as a State Sponsor of 
Terrorism in 1993 ("U. S. Department of State, 2018) and the US imposed economic 
sanctions in 1997 (Verjrr, 2018). The next section illustrates two Salafi-jihadist movements 
and ISIS sympathizers, offering a glimpse of the current violent extremism landscape in 
Sudan. 
 
Tayār al-ᵓUmma al-Wāḥida  
 
Tayār al-ᵓUmma al-Wāḥida (TUW, Pan-Islamist Movement) is a Sudanese Islamist 
ideological movement that advocates uniting all the Islamic groups and calls for the 
renaissance of the Islamic caliphate. According to Mohamed Ali Al-Jizuli, its founder, general 
coordinator, and main ideologue, TUW is neither a preaching group nor a political party; it is 
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rather a movement that campaigns to reform the Islamic community and the world by 
establishing an Islamic state (Al-Madani, 2014a). To propagate its ideas, TUW utilizes regular 
Friday sermons, Islamic indoctrination platforms on campuses, and intensive activities on 
social media ("Pan-Islamist Movement, 2018; M. A. d. a. Al-Jizuli, 2018). 
While leading a mosque in an affluent neighborhood in Khartoum, Al-Jizuli exploits 
Friday sermons to promote ISIS ideology in Sudan. Particularly, in June 2014, not only Al-
Jizuli called for attacks against American interests in Islamic countries but also he rationalized 
this action as Muslims’ religious obligation to establish the Islamic state (M. A. Al-Jizuli, 
2017; Khairalla, 2014). Afterwards, joined by a group of congregants, Al-Jizuli demonstrated 
on the streets in support of ISIS (A. H. Mohamed, 2015; Siddiq, 2014). To explain the nature 
of the movement, Al-Jizuli asserts that “jihadism is part of our ideological project (…) our 
target is not only the American embassies but also all the American companies and 
institutions located in the Islamic world; our target includes civilians, too” (Al-Madani, 
2014b). For Al-Jizuli, Islam does not differentiate between civilians and military as in the 
West. Instead, for him there are two categories: Muḥāribīn (fighters) versus Musālimīn (peace 
seekers). Thus, the United States falls into the Muḥāribīn category that must be fought (Al-
Madani, 2014b). Despite Al-Jizuli’s continuous denial of being an ISIS leader in Sudan, the 
above-mentioned statements branded him as “ISIS commander” in Sudan ("A'ayin Network, 
2014; Almohamadi, 2015; "Salafist Mohamed Ali," 2014). In fact, Al-Jizuli insists that ISIS 
has not appointed him as emir; instead, he strongly sympathizes with the ISIS cause. In his 
own words, “ISIS confronts the American [imperial] plans, the Western expansion, secular 
systems, and the tyrants’ rule (…). We are determined to establish the Islamic State in 
Sudan—this is our religious and ideological goal” ("Salafist Mohamed Ali," 2014).  
In 2015, the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) detained Al-Jizuli for 
eight months in a campaign that targeted the “symbols” that encouraged the UMST students 
to join ISIS. Despite his continuous adherence to the global jihad ideology, Al-Jizuli’s release 
marked the end of an extensive “religious dialogue” that had been initiated and led by the 
Sudanese Global Muslim Brotherhood figure, Issam Ahmed El-Bashir—the then head of the 
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Islamic Jurisprudence Council (Almohamadi, 2015; "National Intelligence Releases," 2016). 
Notwithstanding the lengthy dialogue, Al-Jizuli remained devoted to the global jihad ideology 
because for him, “I hit a dead end in my discussion with those scholars” ("Sudanese Security 
Releases ", 2015).  
In January 2016, Al-Jizuli made headlines when the NISS detained him again for 
conducting a “survey” among the students of Sudan University of Science and Technology 
about the “unity of the Muslim nations and the youths’ obligations when facing the division of 
the Umma” ("National Intelligence Releases," 2016). In an interview that this author 
conducted in Khartoum with the mother of a 23-year-old Sudanese who had joined ISIS in 
2014, she blamed Al-Jizuli for radicalizing her son:  
 
[E]ven if Al-Jizuli has no direct contact with ISIS, but his ideas have. My son has been 
radicalized through listening to his Friday sermons in the neighborhood’s mosque. In 
the months before his departure to Syria, my son used to go there every Friday and 
listen to Al-Jizuli’s khutba. I wonder why the government failed to control such a 
dangerous person. They knew his harmful ideas, and he has influenced many young 
people (Hana, personal interview, July 26, 2018). 
 
Movements, such as the TUW, are local products. The leaders of these movements (e.g., Al-
Jizuli) are very active in society and wield significant influence among the youth. They have 
up-to-date knowledge of information technology and offer their messages in a way that 
appeals to the youth; they are present on campuses, in neighborhood mosques, and on social 
media, and their followers are growing every day. Their speeches are attractive, and they 
focus on issues that are relevant and urgent for their target audience. In contrast, it can be 
observed that the so-called moderate religious scholars who claim to offer narratives that 
counter violent extremism are not as accessible to the youth; they deliver rigid and 
unattractive messages. The next section outlines another pro-ISIS movement active in Sudan.  
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JamāꜤat al-ᵓIꜤtisām Bi al-Kitāb wa al-Sunna 
 
JamāꜤat al-ᵓIꜤtisām Bi al-Kitāb wa al-Sunna (JIKS, Society of Adherence to Quran and 
Sunna) is an offshoot of the MB; since 2014, the movement has been an ISIS sympathizer in 
Sudan (A. H. Mohamed, 2015). The foundation of JIKS dates back to 1979, when (due to 
internal conflicts) the Sudanese Islamic Movement split into two movements: [1] the NIF, led 
by Hassan al-Turabi, and [2] the MB, led by al-Hibir Yousif Nouraldayim. In another 
development, Sheikh Suleiman Abunaru introduced Salafi-jihadist ideas to the latter 
movement, which led to his separation from the historical leadership of the MB and another 
split among its ranks. Subsequently, the International Organization of the MB (IOMB) 
revoked Abunaru’s membership in the movement, which led him to establish JIKS in 1991 
("Alghad TV, 2017; Siddiq, 2014). Remarkably, Abunaru’s group members participated as 
mujahideen (Islamist fighters) in the Soviet–Afghan war (1979–1989) and in the jihad in 
Somalia and imported radical jihad and Salafi-jihadist ideas back to Sudan (Nasr al-Din, 
2015). 
Notably, Abunaru’s followers have pledged bayat (an oath of allegiance) to him as the 
emir of the movement for life ("Sudanese Expiatories ", 2014). Apparently, Abunaru’s 
embrace of Salafism and his emphasis on Salafi-jihadi ideas among the MB’s wider 
membership were unappreciated by the MB leadership and preceded his dismissal from it. 
Moreover, Abunaru noticed the IOMB’s considerable hostility toward his newly established 
movement, when they blocked all sources of funding (Siddiq, 2014). Later, JIKS adopted 
more radical Salafi-jihadist interpretations of Islam, such as declaring haram (forbidden) any 
participation in the 2010 presidential elections in Sudan ("Society of Adherence," 2014). 
Inspired by Sayyid Qutb’s salafi-jihadist ideology, the JIKS movement advocates for the 
transformation of society according to Islamic rules, especially the enforcement of SharīꜤa, 
ḥizba (morality police), and waging armed jihad in the advancement of Islam. Guided by 
Takfiri interpretations of Islamic decrees, the JIKS may declare secularists or Sufis as 
“infidels.” Having pronounced the Sudanese government as one of unbelievers, the movement 
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neither recognizes the modern state territory nor acknowledges its state institutions (A. H. 
Mohamed, 2015; Siddiq, 2014).  
JIKS propagates its ideas through lectures, lessons, and open meetings that are held in 
its center in Khartoum North. The youth are specifically recruited to join the movement to 
perform DaꜤwa (preaching of Islam) and jihad via mosques and religious establishments (e.g., 
al-Bukhary Institute of Sharia Sciences) (A. H. Mohamed, 2015). Similar to the TUW 
movement, in July 2014, the JIKS movement issued a support statement, backing the 
establishment of the ISIS and describing it as “good work” that is obligatory for all Muslims 
(Abunaru, 2014). After Abunaru passed away in December 2014, the movement chose Sheikh 
Omer Abd al-Khaliq as its new emir. Following his predecessor’s example, Abd al-Khaliq 
declared the movement’s support of the 2015 Charlie Hebdo Paris terrorist attacks justifying it 
as Muslims’ obligation to exact revenge and supported ISIS’ execution of the Jordanian pilot 
(A. H. Mohamed, 2015).  
In August 2015, the NISS carried out a campaign that targeted the salafi-jihadists’ 
leaders and detained both Abd al-Khaliq and Al-Jizuli for indoctrinating the youth to join ISIS 
(Musa, 2015; "Sudan Arrests Clerics," 2015). The movements’ subsequent attempts to 
persuade the Sudanese authorities to release their detained leaders all failed, mainly because 
they had been indicted under the Criminal Code and Anti-Terrorism Act ("Mediations to 
Release," 2015; "Salafist Jihadist Group," 2016). Later that year, the authorities concluded 
their investigations and ordered the detained leaders to appear before the Anti-Terrorism 
Court of Sudan ("Investigations with Leaders," 2015). In a campaign aimed at ensuring that 
no Salafi detainees were held in jails in early 2016, the Sudanese authorities released Abd al-
Khaliq, among others, after the prosecutor general dropped the criminal charges against him; 
he then “pledged” to cease disseminating the ISIS ideas among the youth ("Salafist Jihadist 
Group," 2016; "Sudanese Authorities Releases," 2016; "Sudanese Authorities Released ", 
2015). The next section illustrates the response to violent extremism in Sudan.   
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Response to violent extremism in Sudan 
 
The Sudanese government’s narrative tends to decontextualize the rise of violent extremism 
in Sudan and to portray it as an imported phenomenon from abroad. Overlooking the local 
actors’ role in jihadism and the historical context of its development in Sudan, the government 
officials make use of five narratives to dissociate the country from violent extremism. First, 
they connect the rise of violent extremism to the increasing number of immigrants in Sudan 
(Al-Hidaibi, 2016; "Preventing Militant Groups," 2016). Second, the Sudanese authorities 
depict Sudan as an at risk country of terrorism as it is “surrounded by pores of 
inflammation,”(Bakry, 2017) such as ISIS in Libya, Boko Haram in West Africa, and Al-
Shabab in East Africa, which try to “infiltrate” the country through the Darfur Desert 
("Sudanese Security Forces," 2016). Third, the government not only blames violent 
extremism on “external influences,” but also labels the Sudanese youth who have joined the 
extremist groups as “brainwashed” young students who have grown up in the diaspora 
(Bashir, 2017); (see also Abd al-Aziz, 2015; "Turkey Intercepted Sudanese Students," 2015; 
Yaqoub, 2015). Fourth, the political leadership in Sudan deploys conspiracy theories, such as 
the following ambiguous statement by the former Minister of Higher Education (2015): 
“Some institutions recruit the Sudanese students in ISIS.” The ruling NCP declares, “some 
influential entities are working to include Sudan on the U.S. list of state sponsors of 
terrorism” ("National Congress Party," 2015). Furthermore, the former Vice President of 
Sudan, Hassabu Mohamed Abdalrahman, accuses the international community of being 
behind extremism in Arab and African societies, supporting terrorist organizations with 
weapons and logistics ("Sudan Accuses," 2015). Sudanese public figures also make use of 
grand conspiracy theories; for example, the Sudanese politician, Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, 
comments that “ISIS is an American creation that targets Sunni Islam” ("Ali Osman," 2017), 
and the Secretary General of the Council of Scholars, Ebrahim al-Karuri, states that “ISIS is a 
Western creation to defeat Islam and Muslims” ("Sudan Council of Scholars," 2016). The 
government’s final narrative involves introducing Sudan as a “transit point” for jihadists to 
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join ISIS in Libya or other jihadist groups in West Africa ("Belgium Investigates," 2016). 
Although it is likely that these incidents could have actually happened, dealing with them as 
isolated cases hinders perceiving Sudan as anything other than a mere transit point. Instead, 
the officials avoid raising profound questions, such as why Sudan has become a safe haven 
for jihadists and extremists! 
The official narrative deliberately overlooks the homegrown grounds for the rise of 
violent extremism in Sudan, a notable example of which is the growth of Salafi-jihadist 
groups. These groups’ members sympathize with the ideas of ISIS, which raises concerns 
about the spread of violent extremism across the country (Al-Zafir, 2014; Ebrahim, 2014; 
Khalifa, 2014; Merghany, 2014). The rationale behind concealing Sudan’s role in global jihad 
is a desperate attempt to alter the long-standing image of Sudan as a state sponsor of 
terrorism, ascribed to the country since 1993 by the USA ("U. S. Department of State, 2018). 
The next section outlines the government’s “soft” interventions to combat violent extremism 
in Sudan. 
 
Deradicalization practices in Sudan 
 
The Sudanese approach to countering violent extremism combines the legal and security 
framework with “soft” measures of deradicalization. The legal and security framework 
constitutes the law enforcement agencies’ interventions to control terrorist activities and to 
demonstrate the state power (Al-Awad, 2016). As purely securitized counterterrorism 
procedures have proven inadequate, Sudan has adopted a religious rehabilitation program in 
the form of “intellectual treatments through direct dialogues with those who adopt violent 
extremism or join some criminal organizations for various reasons” (M. Gamalaldin, Director 
of the Sudan National Commission for Counter Terrorism, personal interview, August 2). 
Since 2008, ḥiwār fikry (intellectual dialogue) has been the government’s key approach to 
combating violent extremism by persuading violent extremists to abandon their radical ideas 
that have justified their sympathy with and/or participation in violent extremism (Bakry, 
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2017; Bashir, 2017). Several governmental institutions and civil society organizations have 
become involved in the intellectual dialogue with extremists, including the International 
Center for Dawa Studies, the Center for Renaissance and Cultural Communication (El-Said, 
2015, pp. 202-205), and the governmental Center for Intellectual Immunization and Welfare 
(CIIW). Until 2018, about 300 individuals participated in religious dialogue process organized 
by CIIW (E. Nourain, Director Center for Intellectual Immunization and Welfare, personal 
interview, July 8, 2018).  
Since 2015, the concept of religious dialogue has gained momentum amid concerns 
about the rise of violent extremism among Sudanese university students who have joined 
ISIS. Typically led by religious scholars inside and/or outside prisons, ḥiwār fikry advocates 
engaging in conversations with those involved in violent extremism to “correct” their 
religious misconceptions ("Warnings Against  Using Security Measures," 2015). Before the 
dialogue commences, the detainees are asked to write their religious doctrines that they desire 
to discuss with the scholars, and they are categorized according to the level of their religious 
knowledge (E. Nourain, CIIW Director, personal interview, July 8, 2018). In a series of 
structured sessions with scholars, MurajaꜤāt fikriyya (doctrine revisions) comprise 
psychological analyses of the detainees’ personalities and intensive debates on their religious 
views that should lead them to repent (istitāba) and disengage from radical organizations. The 
detainees pledge to cease participating in violent extremism as a condition for being bailed 
from prison (Al-Awad, 2016; Bakry, 2017; "Sudanese Security Service," 2015).  
During the munāṣaḥa (counseling) seminars, religious clerics introduce the concept of 
wasaṭiyya (religious moderation) and central concepts in the Salafi-jihadi movements, such as 
Al-Wala’ wal Bara (loyalty and disavowal), al-Ḥākimiyya (judicature), takfir (accusation of 
apostasy), moral authority, jihad, non-Muslims’ minority situation in Muslim majority 
countries, and the relations with the international community (CIIW Director E. Nourain, 
personal interview, July 8, 2018).  During the religious dialogue, some examples of the issues 
often raised by the program beneficiaries, which they claim as having motivated them to 
engage in violent extremism, include: firstly, the state’s failure to implement the correct 
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SharīꜤa in Sudan; secondly, permitting South Sudan’s independence and leaving it to a non-
Islamic government; thirdly, the government’s collaboration with the USA on 
counterterrorism instead of waging jihad against it; fourthly, preventing mujāhīdin from 
migrating to support the vulnerable groups against Western invasion. Other political issues 
mentioned by the radicalized youth as drivers for violent extremism include the entry of 
foreign forces in Darfur, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the Western hegemony (E. Nourain, 
CIIW Director, personal interview, July 8, 2018; see also Bakry, 2017; Elnour, 2017).  
In an attempt to refute these arguments, the scholars demonstrate to the jihadists that 
the SharīꜤa is indeed practiced in Sudan, and they normally cite examples of punishment for 
alcohol consumption or women detained by al-Niẓām al-ᵓĀm (moral police) for indecent 
clothing. In response to the youths’ questions about the rationale behind concealing the 
SharīꜤa-related cases from the public, the scholars justify that this is a deliberate act rooted in 
Islam to preserve the dignity of individuals. The scholars justify South Sudan’s independence 
as a result of a referendum, a practice rooted in the Islamic tradition of shūrā (consultation 
with those affected by that decision) (CIIW staff member, personal interview, July 12, 2018). 
On the issue of collaboration with the USA and the West, the scholars explain to the 
radicalized youths that it is not wise to fight a much more powerful enemy—“with a 
superpower such as America, we [the Government of Sudan] must take a middle course; we 
comply in certain things and defy others” (CIIW staff member, personal interview, July 12, 
2018). In the same vein, the scholars justify that the United Nations has imposed 
counterterrorism measures on all nations, including Sudan; therefore, they have to practice 
taqiyya12 and implement the policies under coercion.  
According to the CIIW director, the majority of the beneficiaries have been entirely 
convinced to abandon their radical ideas, while several of them have been partially convinced. 
Both groups have committed to disengagement and moved on to the reintegration program. 
The youths that have totally rejected the dialogue and refused to repent of their radical ideas 
have been offered the opportunity to continue the dialogue in their locations, whether in 
 
12 Taqiyya is the precautionary dissimulation of religious beliefs and practices in the face of persecution (Walker, 
2009).  
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higher educational institutions or in mosques. After “graduation” from religious dialogue, the 
reintegration program is considered the last step of the deradicalization program where CIIW 
facilitates the reintegration of the disengaged individuals in society. Subject to individual 
needs, the procedures of the reintegration program includes, providing the disengaged 
individuals with job placement, reinstatement in a university, or financial assistance to 
establish a small businesses. In this regard, CIIW collaborates with other institutions such as 
the Ministry of Higher Education, the Zakat Chamber, and microfinance institutions. 
Considered as a reintegration mechanism, the program provides the disengaged individuals 
who are interested in having a stable family life with financial assistance for marriage through 
the Marriage Support Fund (CIIW Director E. Nourain, personal interview, July 8, 2018; see 
also Bakry, 2017; Bashir, 2017). This program also targets returnees from violent extremism 
war zones, encouraging them to refute the ideas that prompted them to join the terrorist 
groups ("Sudanese Security Rescues," 2018). 
 
Discussion 
 
The religious dialogue program operated by the Sudanese government, which aims to 
convince jihadists to reconsider violence extremism faces various constrains. First, the 
government’s official narrative about violent extremism in Sudan denies recognizing the 
phenomenon as rooted in society. Furthermore, the doctrine revisions and religious dialogue 
processes utilize top-down approach, with no room for self-initiated doctrine revisions. These 
findings underline the importance of the bottom-up doctrine revisions that took place in 
Egypt, where the leaders of the Islamist militant groups renounced violence and promoted 
peace and coexistence with the government and society (Gunaratna & Bin Ali, 2009). In an 
unbalanced power relationship, the scholars involved in the religious debates with the 
detainees exercise their authority on the interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, and the 
detainees are typically coerced into agreeing with the scholars’ interpretation. For fear of 
prolonged detention, the detainees show that they are convinced and pledge to exit the radical 
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groups. These findings confirm Koehler’s critique of the ideological debates that they utilize 
the state-sanctioned version of Islam in an attempt to create a cognitive opening or induce 
individual deradicalization (2017). 
Given the growing rates of recruitment into violent extremist groups in Sudan, the 
concepts of religious debates, doctrine revisions, and religious counseling have been proven 
to exert a limited influence on counterterrorism efforts in the country. Undertaken after the 
jihadists have joined violent extremist groups, these programs also offer weak 
counterarguments in comparison to those presented by the jihadist recruiters. These findings 
underline Horgan’s (2009) critique of deradicalization (understood as the change in a person’s 
ideological conviction and thereby commitment to terrorist groups) as he has found a physical 
role change (i.e. disengagement) to be a much more feasible outcome.  
The scholars at the governmental CIIW have been unsuccessful in offering convincing 
alternative narratives compared with those that the jihadists deliver about jihad, martyrdom, 
relations with the West, and issues on the establishment of the state of the Islamic caliphate. 
The reason for this failure is that the religious debates are based on the premise that extremists 
have been misguided and indoctrinated with a misleading interpretation of Islam, and the 
scholars aim to teach the participants the correct tenets of Islam (Koehler, 2017). The scholars 
also focus on debating about the ideology of the participants without taking into account the 
political, social, and relational setting that informs the participants’ experiences in the 
community (Marsden, 2017).  
Given the regime’s history of sponsoring terrorism, counterterrorism experts are 
skeptical about the Sudanese regime’s sincerity to “correct” the extremists’ 
misconceptions/misinterpretations of Islam (Zalan, 2017). In other words, since the 1990s, the 
regime has imposed a strict interpretation of SharīꜤa on society, declared the civil war in the 
South as jihad against the Sudan People Liberation Movement, and created conditions 
conducive to the expansion of radical extremism in society—actions that undermine the 
regime’s credibility in eradicating extremism in Sudan (Abdalla, 2017). Being an integral part 
of the conservative Islamic Jurisprudence Council (MajmaꜤ al-Fiqh al-Islami), the state-
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operated deradicalization center is far from achieving the task of correcting the 
misconceptions of radical youths, mainly because violent extremism is ingrained in the 
Sudanese state’s Islamist ideology (Ahmed, 2018; Baldo, 2017; Zalan, 2017).  
Sudan’s deradicalization efforts have largely been part of the government’s attempt to 
remove Sudan from the US government’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, ascribed to the 
country since 1993 ("U. S. Department of State, 2018). Sudan’s support of global jihad 
movements and its hosting of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in the 1990s (Hansen, 2018) 
have been among several reasons behind the imposition of decades of trade embargos and 
economic sanctions on the country (Zalan, 2016). The sanctions have had severe negative 
effects on the Sudanese economy, and the regime has been lobbying for years to lift the 
restrictions (Verjrr, 2018). To achieve this goal, the government of Sudan has tried to 
demonstrate itself as a reliable partner in the “war on terror” through various measures, and 
the USA has acknowledged Sudan’s deradicalization programs ("U. S. Department of State, 
2018). This recognition explains the assertive statement by the deputy director of the Sudan 
National Commission for Counter Terrorism: “Sudan is moving in the right direction, and the 
international community appreciates Sudan’s efforts against terrorism, which would 
contribute to removing Sudan’s name from the list of state sponsors of terrorism” (Bakry, 
2017; see also"ISIS Members Children," 2017).  
It is by no means an overstatement to claim that the regime’s collaboration with the 
USA on counterterrorism is rather a pragmatic act. The Muslim clerics at the deradicalization 
facility use the Islamic concept of taqiyya to rationalize their cooperation with America. The 
deradicalization center’s staff members believe that the US sanctions are unjust to Sudan; 
therefore, they have to practice taqiyya and pretend to implement the counterterrorism 
programs imposed by the USA “to dodge its evil” (CIIW staff member, personal interview, 
July 12, 2018). In this atmosphere of pressure, they dissimulate their religious beliefs about 
jihadism and pretend to enforce America’s agenda on counterterrorism to avoid the harm 
inflicted by the superpower.  
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By examining the process and the content of the “religious dialogue,” an observer can 
easily discern how far it is from being intellectual. At the ideological and the political levels, 
the dialogue process often appears as if the scholars are affirming the government’s actions by 
using Islamic tenets, such as taqiyya or action under coercion. The deradicalization program 
leaders have chosen to “take a middle course” rather than shape a narrative founded on the 
precepts of human rights and democratic principles as a basis for tolerant coexistence with 
others. The programs that are held in the form of seminars and lectures in either jails or the 
premises of the intelligence office are outdated and conventional. Similar findings are 
reported in Yemen (Barret & Bokhari, 2009), where the regime is less interested in actual 
ideological engagement and more concerned about political expediency because of the US 
pressure on the country.  
Sudan’s apparent “progress” in its counterterrorism cooperation with the USA led to 
the lifting of certain economic sanctions in October 2017 (Verjrr, 2018). However, Sudan’s 
intolerant regime and long-established tradition of religious persecution have raised serious 
questions about the regime’s genuine goals in its counterterrorism efforts (Baldo, 2017). 
Moreover, the government’s cooperation on counterterrorism necessitates breaking ties with 
its radical past and battling extremism at home—a delicate balancing act that may undermine 
its Islamic-based legitimacy since 1989 (Zalan, 2017).   
Often, Sudanese officials tend to exaggerate their achievements in the Sudanese 
deradicalization program and portray the Sudanese experiment as “an unprecedented 
experience” and a model that can be applied to other contexts to benefit the world (CIIW 
Director E. Nourain, personal interview, July 8, 2018; see also Bakry, 2017; Bashir, 2017; 
Mukhtar, 2018). However, these claims remain highly questioned in the absence of an 
independent mechanism to evaluate the deradicalization program. Besides the macro factors 
and the micro components, the conditions conducive to successful deradicalization programs, 
including religious rehabilitation, are absent in Sudan (El-Said, 2015).  
In conclusion, the political leaders’ narrative about the rise of violent extremism in 
Sudan and their response to it are remote from reality. While the government portrays the rise 
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of violent extremism in Sudan as an alien phenomenon, sociopolitical observers increasingly 
witness the bottom-up growth of Pan-Islamist and Salafi-jihadi movements that are committed 
to establishing a global Islamic state and legitimate the use of violence to achieve their 
political and religious goals. The official narrative of the deradicalization program in Sudan is 
flawed. While they inflate the success of this program is inflated, it is clear to many 
researchers that it is a top-down process, far from being genuine, and aimed at collecting 
political gains for the regime. 
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